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THE APRIL 2007 U.S.–EU “OPEN SKIES” 
AGREEMENT: A DREAM OF 
LIBERALIZATION DEFERRED 
Christian Westra* 
Abstract: The April 2007 Open Skies Agreement between the United 
States and the European Union has been hailed as a landmark in aviation 
deregulation. Under the terms of the agreement, any U.S. or EU airline 
may fly between any city in the United States and Europe—a major depar-
ture from the byzantine restrictions that previously characterized transat-
lantic air travel. Nevertheless, in several key respects, the treaty stops short 
of full deregulation. This Note assesses the probable impact of the Open 
Skies Agreement and explores why EU negotiators were willing to com-
promise on several of their core objectives. 
Introduction 
 On April 30, 2007, the first aviation agreement between the 
United States and the European Union (EU) was signed in Washing-
ton.1 Hailed by European Commission Vice-President Jacques Barrot 
as a “centerpiece for today’s reinvigorated transatlantic relationship,”2 
the U.S.–EU Open Skies Agreement (Open Skies Agreement)3 marks 
a clear departure from the web of tangled bilateral treaties that have 
governed transatlantic aviation since World War II.4 For the first time 
in the history of modern aviation, any U.S. or EU airline will be per-
mitted to fly between any city in the United States and Europe.5 
                                                                                                                      
* Christian Westra is Executive Note Editor of the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review and a joint degree candidate at the Fletcher School of Law & Diplo-
macy. 
1 2007 O.J. (L 134) 4–41 [hereinafter Open Skies Agreement]. 
2 EU News Release, Open Skies: Jacques Barrot in Washington to Sign Historic Avia-
tion Deal at the EU-US Transatlantic Summit (Apr. 30, 2007), http://www.eurunion.org/ 
News/press/2007/2007044.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2007). 
3 See generally John Bruton, The Sky’s the Limit for Trans-Atlantic Air Travelers, Seattle 
Times, June 23, 2006 (noting that in Europe, the treaty is generally referred to as “Open 
Aviation Agreement”). 
4 See Robert M. Hardaway, Of Cabbages and Cabotage: The Case for Opening up the U.S. Air-
line Industry to International Competition, 34 Transp. L. J. 1, 2–12 (2007). 
5 Open Skies Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2(a); see also EU Backing for “Open Skies” 
Deal, BBC News, Mar. 22, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6477969.stm (“any 
 
162 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 32:161 
 Yet, just how significant is this departure in treaty law for airline 
passengers? Michael O’Leary, chief executive officer of the European 
low-cost airline Ryanair, has gone so far as to proclaim the advent of 
fifteen dollar transatlantic tickets by 2010.6 Others have heralded the 
Open Skies Agreement as a first step towards opening the U.S. domes-
tic aviation market to foreign competition.7 In reality, however, unless 
the European Union manages to wrest more concessions from the 
United States in the next round of Open Skies treaty negotiations, 
such prognostications are likely to go unmet.8 
 This Note begins in Part I by providing historical context on the de-
velopment of aviation regulatory law, offering a comparative view of 
trends in the United States and Europe before examining the transatlan-
tic regulatory order. Part II discusses the negotiations leading up to final-
ization of the Open Skies Agreement and examines the most significant 
provisions of the treaty, namely those related to cabotage—the right to 
transport passengers within a given country—and foreign investment 
control. Part III analyzes the key concessions made to seal the Open 
Skies Agreement. Finally, Part IV concludes by arguing that passengers 
on both sides of the Atlantic would have benefited had the European 
Union realized more of its strategic objectives. Major issues for consid-
eration during the second round of open skies negotiations, which is 
scheduled to commence by the end of 2008, are highlighted in closing. 
I. Background 
A. The United States 
 For most of the Twentieth Century, the U.S. government smoth-
ered airline competition under a thick blanket of legislative regula-
tion.9 In the early years of U.S. commercial aviation, foreign invest-
                                                                                                                      
EU-based airline will be allowed to fly from any city within the EU to any city in the US, 
and vice versa”). 
6 Nicola Clark, A Flight of Fantasy: €10 to Cross the Atlantic, Int’l Herald Trib., Apr. 14, 
2006, at 11. 
7 U.S. Airline Group Backs “Open Skies” Potential, Reuters, Mar. 22, 2007, http://www. 
reuters.com/article/tnBasicIndustries-SP/idUSN2235098020070322 (noting some Euro-
pean carriers hope Open Skies Agreement will eventually lead to “full liberalization of the 
U.S. domestic air market”). 
8 See Dan Bilefsky & Nicola Clark, EU Backs U.S. Deal on Atlantic Air Routes: “Open Skies” 
Accord Should Lower Fares but Draws Criticism, Int’l Herald Trib., Mar. 23, 2007, at 1. 
9 See Hardaway, supra note 4, at 2–12; see also Christopher McBay, Airline Deregulation De-
serves Another Shot: How Foreign Investment Restrictions and Subsidies Actually Hurt the Airline 
Industry, 72 J. Air L. & Com. 173, 175–80 (2007). 
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ment in U.S. airlines was heavily restricted.10 The Air Commerce Act 
of 1926 (ACA) mandated that U.S. citizens own at least fifty-one per-
cent of any aircraft registered in the United States.11 Moreover, the 
ACA also stipulated that the board of directors of any U.S. airline be 
comprised of at least two-thirds U.S. citizens.12 Anxious to safeguard 
U.S. neutrality in the aftermath of World War I, Congress sought to 
block foreign control of U.S. aircraft that might conceivably be co-
opted into armed service abroad.13 
 The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (CAA) went considerably fur-
ther in restricting competition.14 As an additional bar to foreign in-
vestment, the CAA required that U.S. citizens own or control at least 
seventy-five percent of the voting rights in any U.S. carrier.15 Beyond 
fixing prices for air transportation in a manner akin to the way in 
which the Interstate Commerce Commission fixed prices for U.S. rail-
roads,16 the CAA also established “virtually absolute barriers to entry” 
for new competitors.17 Although new entrants into the U.S. market 
could theoretically obtain permission to fly, in reality the Civil Aero-
nautics Board established under the CAA did not allow a single new 
competitor to enter the market between 1938 and 1975.18 During that 
period, the U.S. aviation industry grew by a staggering 23,800 percent, 
even as the five largest carriers operating in the United States enjoyed 
a de facto oligopoly.19 
 By the 1970s, pressure for deregulation had reached a breaking 
point.20 During the 1975 Kennedy hearings on aviation deregulation, 
industry experts testified that regulated airfares were between forty 
and one-hundred percent higher than they would be without gov-
ernment price fixing, with a resultant cost to consumers of roughly 
                                                                                                                      
10 See Hardaway, supra note 4, at 2–12. 
11 McBay, supra note 9, at 175. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 See Hardaway, supra note 4, at 4. 
15 McBay, supra note 9, at 176. 
16 See Hardaway, supra note 4, at 3 (noting how ICC obligated government to do “dirty 
work of fixing prices” in much same way that CAA would obligate government with regard 
to aviation industry). 
17 See id. at 4. 
18 Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Civil Aeronautics Board—Opening Wide 
the Floodgates of Entry, 11 Transp. L.J. 91, 115 (1979). 
19 Hardaway, supra note 4, at 4 (citing Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform 
206 (1982)). 
20 See id. at 3–4; see also McBay, supra note 9, at 178. 
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$3.5 billion annually in excess fares.21 Congress responded with the 
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA), which eliminated govern-
ment price fixing and opened the aviation industry to new entrants.22 
Over the next few decades, a host of new airlines entered the U.S. 
market and fares fell considerably.23 Nevertheless, foreign investors 
were still barred from taking any more than twenty-five percent of vot-
ing stock in a U.S. carrier.24 
B. Europe 
 In 1957, the European Economic Community (EEC)25 was estab-
lished under the Treaty of Rome.26 Although the Treaty of Rome 
granted the EEC the authority to create “the framework of a common 
transport policy”27 within Europe, it limited this authority to rail, road, 
and inland waterway transport.28 The Treaty of Rome permitted pan-
European regulation of maritime and air transport, but only in the 
event of a unanimous vote by the Council of Europe (Council).29 
 Despite the language of the Treaty of Rome, throughout the 
1970s and 1980s a number of European Court of Justice (ECJ) deci-
sions lent support to the notion that the EEC had some power to 
regulate maritime and air transport within its member states, even 
without universal Council approval.30 By 1987, the question had been 
made moot by the Single European Act, which formally amended the 
Treaty of Rome to change the Council’s voting system from a unani-
mous system to a qualified majority system.31 
                                                                                                                      
21 Hardaway, supra note 4, at 4. 
22 See id. at 4. 
23 See id. at 5. 
24 McBay, supra note 9, at 176. 
25 The European Economic Community was formed in 1952. In 1992, the term “Eco-
nomic” was removed by the Maastricht Treaty, which made the newly-termed European 
Communities one of three pillars of the European Union, along with Common Foreign 
and Security Policy and Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters. 
26 Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997) 
[hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. 
27 Id. 
28 See Jacob A. Warden, “Open Skies” at a Crossroads: How the United States and European 
Union Should Use the ECJ Transport Cases to Reconstruct the Transatlantic Aviation Regime, Nw. J. 
Int’l L. & Bus. 227, 232 (2003). 
29 Id. 
30 See id. at 232–33 (citing Commission v. French Republic (French Seaman) (1974) 
(holding that general principles of Treaty of Rome could be applied to maritime travel); 
Ministere Public v. Lucas Asjes (Nouvelles Frontieres) (1986) (holding same to be true with 
regard to air travel)). 
31 Id. at 233. 
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 Aviation deregulation followed between 1987 and 1992 with en-
actment of the “three packages,” a series of regulatory reforms.32 Al-
though the “first package” had little real impact, the “second pack-
age” increased the power of airlines to set fares and allowed for 
expanded travel within Europe.33 By 1997, when the provisions of the 
“third package” had come into force, all EU Member States enjoyed 
full cabotage rights to fly routes within other EU countries.34 As in the 
United States, a number of new low-cost airlines emerged to chal-
lenge the dominance of established legacy carriers.35 
C. Transatlantic Aviation 
 As the U.S. Third Army rumbled toward Nazi Germany in the 
closing months of World War II, trade negotiators from the Allied 
powers set about laying the foundation for a postwar transatlantic 
aviation order in Chicago.36 Affirming the central precept of the 1919 
Paris Aeronautical Convention—that states maintain sovereignty over 
their airspace—the 1944 Chicago Convention established the princi-
ple that although nations are free to bar foreign carriers from com-
mercial access to their airports, they may not restrict foreign carriers 
from entering their national airspace.37 As the strongest commercial 
aviation power, the United States pushed for further liberalization in 
air travel, although it was unable to achieve a broader multilateral 
consensus.38 
 Instead, scores of bilateral agreements between the United States 
and other nations were enacted following the Chicago Convention.39 
The most significant of these early agreements was the 1946 “Bermuda 
I” agreement between the United States and Great Britain, which 
                                                                                                                      
32 Id.; see also Monica E. Antezana, The European Union Internet Copyright Directive as Even 
More Than It Envisions, 26 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 415 (2003) (illustrating another ef-
fort at EU integration). 
33 Warden, supra note 28, at 233–34. 
34 Id. at 234. 
35 Among the most successful early low-cost European carriers were Selios Haji-
Ioannou’s UK-based Easyjet and Ireland-based Ryanair. See Ryanair Profits Take Off, BBC 
News, August 9, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/business/2175319.stm. 
36 See E. Rebecca Kreis, A Comparative Analysis of the Aviation Network Within the European 
Community and the Ad-Hoc Network Between the United States and Central America, 24 Transp. 
L.J. 303, 305–11 (1997) (illustrating origins of early European aviation treaties during first 
decades of twentieth century). 
37 Id. at 307–09 (noting that Convention on International Civil Aviation signed at Chi-
cago in 1944 established nine so-called “freedoms of the air”). 
38 See id. at 308. 
39 Id. at 311. 
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served as a model for hundreds of subsequent bilateral aviation agree-
ments around the world.40 Under Bermuda I and its progeny, fares and 
tariffs were set by an international body, the International Air Trans-
port Association.41 Consequently, throughout much of the postwar pe-
riod, airlines traveling international routes competed not on price but 
on “capacity and service frequency,” with the result that international 
air travel remained beyond the means of most U.S. and European trav-
elers.42 
 In 1977, the Bermuda I agreement was amended as “Bermuda 
II.”43 Under Bermuda II, only two U.S. airlines—American Airlines 
and United Airlines—were permitted to service London’s Heathrow 
Airport.44 In addition, non-stop service from Great Britain to America 
was restricted to a fixed number of “gateway cities” in the United 
States.45 The agreement represented a successful effort by British pro-
tectionists to eliminate the supposed “excess capacity” of U.S. carriers 
traveling to Britain.46 Although the U.S. government pushed strenu-
ously for looser regulation, the British controlled access to Heathrow, 
Europe’s busiest airport, and thus exercised considerable leverage.47 
 Despite the highly restrictive nature of Bermuda II, transatlantic 
aviation became increasingly open following passage of the U.S. Air-
line Deregulation Act of 1978.48 Airline alliances49 and code sharing 
agreements enabled U.S. carriers to circumvent restrictions on air 
travel within Europe by partnering with EU carriers.50 Moreover, bi-
lateral open skies agreements between the United States and individ-
ual European countries began to proliferate, enabling transatlantic 
service to new U.S. cities.51 
                                                                                                                      
40 See Warden, supra note 28, at 230. 
41 Id. at 230–31. 
42 Id. at 231. 
43 Kreis, supra note 36, at 311–12. 
44 See US Airways Group v. British Airways, 989 F.Supp. 482, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (de-
scribing “nature” of U.S.-U.K. airline industry as of late-1990s). 
45 Air Service Agreements Between the United Kingdom and the United 
States, Select Comm. on Env’t., Transp. and Regulatory Affairs, Eighteenth Re-
port (2000), http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/ 
cmenvtra/532/53206.htm#note38. 
46 Kreis, supra note 36, at 311–12. 
47 See id. at 312. 
48 See id. at 312–14. 
49 See Hardaway, supra note 4, at 24 (discussing Oneworld, SkyTeam and Star Alliance). 
50 See Kreis, supra note 36, at 312–14. 
51 Warden, supra note 28, at 236–37. 
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 The first of these bilateral agreements, a 1992 treaty between the 
United States and the Netherlands, permitted unrestricted landing 
rights within each signatory’s territory.52 Prior to the agreement, 
flights between the United States and the Netherlands had been lim-
ited in number and restricted to certain airports.53 As a result of the 
agreement, Dutch carrier KLM found itself at a significant competi-
tive advantage as compared to other European carriers.54 KLM not 
only enjoyed the flexibility to chart routes anywhere in the United 
States to meet market demand; as a further incentive to the Dutch 
government, the U.S. Department of Transportation also exempted 
KLM from U.S. antitrust restrictions in its alliance with Northwest Air-
lines.55 Other bilateral Open Skies agreements soon followed between 
the United States and various members of the European Union.56 By 
2007, bilateral agreements had been concluded with sixteen EU 
Member States.57 
 Although the bilateral Open Skies agreements negotiated between 
the United States and individual European countries may have helped 
to liberalize transatlantic aviation, they nevertheless fell flat in the face 
of European integration.58 The ECJ signified its disapproval in a series 
of consolidated rulings in 2002.59 Noting that bilateral Open Skies 
agreements between the United States and the European Union con-
tradicted the spirit of the “three packages” reforms, the ECJ held that 
EU Member States entering into such agreements “infringed the rules 
on the division of powers between the Community and the Member 
States.”60 The court extended its condemnation to the Bermuda II 
                                                                                                                      
52 Agis Salpukas, U.S. and Dutch Agree on a Pact to Aid Airlines, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1992, 
at A1. 
53 See id. 
54 Warden, supra note 28, at 236–37. 
55 Kreis, supra note 36, at 314 (noting immunity as method of enticing countries to en-
ter into open-skies agreements). 
56 In addition to its open skies agreement with the Netherlands, the United States ne-
gotiated similar agreements with Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxem-
bourg and Sweden. See Alford & Champley, The Impact of the 2007 U.S.–EU Open 
Skies Air Transport Agreement, Int’l Trade Admin. Occasional Paper no. 07–001 2 
(2007), http://trade.gov/media/Publications/pdf/openskies_2007.pdf. 
57 Id. 
58 See Press Release, Europa, Open Sky Agreements: Commission Welcomes European 
Court of Justice ruling (Nov. 5, 2002), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? 
reference=IP/02/1609&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en [hereinaf-
ter Commission Welcomes ECJ Ruling] (last visited Nov. 7, 2007). 
59 Cases C-466/98-C-469/98, C-471/98-C-472/98, C-475/98-C-476/98, Comm’n v. UK, 
DK, S, FIN, B, L, AUS, G, (31 Jan. 2002). 
60 Id. at Concluding Observations. 
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agreement.61 Yet even if the ECJ was unambiguous in its criticism of 
bilateral aviation treaties negotiated by individual EU Member States, it 
did not rule out a broader Open Skies agreement between the United 
States and the European Union as a whole.62 On the contrary, the ECJ 
explicitly endorsed the notion.63 As European Commission Vice Presi-
dent for Transport and Energy Loyola de Palacio commented, “it is 
clear from the Court’s ruling that we will all have to work together in 
Europe to identify and pursue our objectives jointly.”64 
I. Discussion 
 It took five years for the United States and the European Union 
to emerge from the rubble of the ECJ’s 2002 rulings.65 Finally, in the 
spring of 2007, the United States and the European Union concluded 
a comprehensive Open Skies treaty.66 The U.S.–EU Open Skies 
Agreement, signed on April 30, 2007 in conjunction with a U.S.–EU 
summit in Washington, took effect on March 30, 2008.67 Although it 
touches on many aspects of commercial aviation, from code sharing 
to security, the most contentious provisions of the treaty relate to 
cabotage and foreign airline ownership rights.68 
 Article 3 of the Open Skies Agreement deals with cabotage.69 
Under Article 3(c)(i), U.S. carriers have the right to fly from Europe 
to the United States via “intermediate points” in any EU Member 
State.70 For example, American Airlines may fly from Berlin to Am-
sterdam before continuing on to Boston.71 Likewise, under Article 
3(c)(ii), EU carriers are free to fly from any point in the European 
Union to any point in the United States without necessarily touching 
their “home country.”72 A British Airways flight, in other words, may 
                                                                                                                      
61 Id. 
62 Commission Welcomes ECJ Ruling, supra note 58. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Press Release, U.S. Mission to the EU, U.S., EU Agree to Reduce Regulatory and 
Trade Barriers (Apr. 30, 2007), available at http://useu.usmission.gov/Article.asp?ID= 
74174DC1–203C-48EA-87F6-C58557DEB56A [hereinafter U.S., EU Agree to Reduce Barri-
ers] (last visited Nov. 1, 2007). 
66 Open Skies Agreement, supra note 1. 
67 Id. 
68 See Don Phillips, “Open Skies” Reality Still Proves Elusive, Int’l Herald Trib., June 5, 
2006, at 10 (discussing cabotage and airline ownership rights). 
69 Open Skies Agreement, supra note 1, art. 3. 
70 Id. art. 3(c)(i). 
71 See id. 
72 Id. art. 3(c)(ii). 
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fly from Madrid to Chicago without landing in London.73 Notably, 
however, Article 3 does not authorize EU carriers to fly between 
points in the United States before returning to Europe.74 Thus, Virgin 
Atlantic may not operate flights within the United States, although it 
may take a limited equity stake in U.S. carriers.75 
 Ownership rights under the Open Skies Agreement are discussed 
in Article 6 of the treaty and elaborated in Annex 4.76 U.S. investors 
are guaranteed the right to participate as minority shareholders in 
any EU carrier, provided that the carrier is majority-owned and con-
trolled by EU Member States or nationals.77 EU investors may hold up 
to 49.9 percent of total equity in a U.S. carrier, but are limited to 
twenty-five percent voting equity.78 On a case-by-case basis, ownership 
by EU nationals of fifty percent or more of the total equity of a U.S. 
carrier is permitted under the agreement, although such ownership 
“shall not be presumed to constitute control of that airline.”79 Not-
withstanding the other provisions in Annex 4, the European Commu-
nity reserves the right to limit investment by U.S. nationals in the vot-
ing equity of EU carriers “to a level equivalent to that allowed by the 
United States for foreign nations in U.S. airlines.”80 
 The issue of foreign ownership rights is not technically linked to 
the concept of cabotage, but European negotiators insisted from the 
beginning that the European Union would not implement an open 
skies agreement unless the United States relaxed its “regulatory grip 
on airline investment.”81 While foreign investors may participate pas-
sively on the corporate boards of U.S. carriers, they have nonetheless 
been historically restricted under the CAA from taking an active role 
in most operational decisions.82 As a prerequisite to any Open Skies 
agreement, European negotiators demanded that their U.S. counter-
                                                                                                                      
73 See id. 
74 Id. art. 3. 
75 See John Hughes, Branson, Rejected or Not, May Win in U.S. Airline Bid, Bloomberg, Dec. 
5, 2006, http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aQs7zO5NbyQw (not-
ing that this is essentially what UK-based Virgin Atlantic has done by putting up twenty-five 
percent of the initial $177 million investment to start Virgin America). 
76 Open Skies Agreement, supra note 1, art. 6 & annex 4. 
77 Id. art. 2. 
78 Id. annex 4, art. 1(a). 
79 Id. annex 4, art. 1(b). 
80 Id. annex 4, art. 3. 
81 Phillips, supra note 68, at 10. 
82 Id. 
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parts agree to loosen their restrictions on foreign investment.83 Early 
on, at least, it seemed this might happen.84 
 U.S. and EU negotiators reached a preliminary Open Skies 
agreement in November 2005.85 The terms of the tentative agreement 
granted each U.S. and EU carrier the right “to fly between every city 
in the EU and every city in the United States,” and “to operate with-
out restrictions on routes or capacity.”86 EU Commission support for 
the agreement was predicated upon U.S. congressional approval of an 
administrative rule proposed by the Department of Transportation 
(DOT) to allow foreign investors a greater role in the management of 
U.S. carriers.87 Under the proposed DOT rule, foreign investors from 
Open Skies partner nations would be free to make “operational deci-
sions” on issues such as rates and routes, although they would still be 
prohibited from having control over “security, safety and defense is-
sues related to the airlines.”88 According to the DOT, the proposed 
rule would reinterpret, rather than replace, the ownership require-
ments of the CAA.89 
 After a preliminary Open Skies agreement was negotiated in No-
vember 2005, the proposed DOT rule was submitted to Congress for 
comments.90 Officials from the DOT testified at length in favor of the 
proposal.91 Nevertheless, this did little to allay congressional concerns 
                                                                                                                      
83 See id. 
84 See Press Release, U.S. Mission to the EU, Airline Foreign Control Rule Might Be De-
layed, U.S. Official Says (Apr. 25, 2006), http://useu.usmission.gov/Article.asp?ID=CE 
1729F4-EFBB-451F-ABA7–163A2766A059 [hereinafter Foreign Control Rule Might be 
Delayed] (last visited Nov. 1, 2007) (discussing preliminary November 2005 open skies 
agreement). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 See Press Release, U.S. Mission to the EU, U.S, EU Reach Long-Sought Accord To Lib-
eralize Air Traffic U.S. Mission to the European Union (Mar. 2, 2007), http://useu. 
usmission.gov/Article.asp?ID=E315F141–7EFD-4CBB-B249-F7F5FED60445 [hereinafter U.S., 
EU Reach Long-Sought Accord] (last visited Nov. 1, 2007). 
88 Press Release, Andrzej Zwaniecki, U.S. Mission to the EU, U.S. Remains Committed 
to Airline Deal with Europe, Officials Say (Aug. 17, 2006), http://useu.usmission.gov/ 
Article.asp?ID=CDF512F7–24CA-47EC-A090-D4B050658B16 [hereinafter U.S. Remains Com-
mitted to Airline Deal] (last visited Nov. 1, 2007). 
89 Id. 
90 Press Release, Andrzej Zwaniecki, U.S. Mission to the EU, House Approves Morato-
rium on Airline Foreign Ownership Rule (Mar. 17, 2006), http://useu.usmission.gov/ 
Article.asp?ID=A2DF41A5-F981–4C72–9636-E02FEF1C3C3A [hereinafter House Approves 
Moratorium] (last visited Nov. 1, 2007). 
91 Press Release, Andrzej Zwaniecki, U.S. Mission to the EU, U.S. Officials Urge Congress 
Not to Block Airline Investment Rule (Feb. 8, 2006), http://useu.usmission.gov/Article.asp? 
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related to labor and aviation security.92 Additional concerns regarding 
the breadth of DOT’s power to issue rules reinterpreting established 
law were also raised.93 By the end of 2006, the proposed rule had been 
withdrawn from consideration.94 “It is necessary now,” said lead U.S. 
negotiator John Byerly, “on both sides of the Atlantic to accept the 
reality that a major change in U.S. rules governing control of U.S. air-
lines is simply not in the cards.”95 
 One might infer from the great efforts taken by the White House 
to implement the proposed DOT rule that no Open Skies agreement 
with the European Union would be feasible without it.96 On the con-
trary, once the DOT proposal was withdrawn from Congress, a U.S. 
delegation rushed to Brussels in January 2007 “to discuss possible so-
lutions to the stalemate.”97 Less than two months later, U.S. and EU 
negotiators reported a breakthrough—without any change to U.S. 
aviation foreign investment law.98 How was the seemingly intractable 
gap between the U.S and EU positions closed? What concessions were 
made by each side, and just how meaningful were they? Finally, what 
implications do these concessions have for passengers on both sides of 
the Atlantic? 
III. Analysis 
 On its face, there is little question that the U.S.–EU Open Skies 
Agreement favors the United States.99 In terms of cabotage rights, the 
agreement is clearly lopsided.100 Although it grants U.S. carriers the 
right to fly routes within Europe, the Open Skies Agreement does not 
                                                                                                                      
ID=EAF3C76D-580D-49D8–906E-133A1F8245EC [hereinafter U.S. Officials Urge Congress] 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2007). 
92 See id. 
93 See id. (noting “members of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Subcom-
mittee on Aviation uniformly questioned not only the rule itself but even [DOT’s] author-
ity to issue it”). 
94 Foreign Control Rule Might be Delayed, supra note 84. 
95 Press Release, Andrzej Zwaniecki, U.S. Mission to the EU, U.S., EU to Look at Op-
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permit EU carriers the right to fly within the United States.101 In 
terms of foreign investment rights, the picture is murkier.102 U.S. and 
EU investors alike are proscribed from gaining “control” of each 
other’s carriers.103 On the other hand, while U.S. nationals are limited 
to a minority stake in EU carriers, EU nationals may, on a case-by-case 
basis, take more than a fifty percent equity stake in U.S. carriers, pro-
vided that the investment is not interpreted as signifying control.104 
Given that the discretion to adjudicate on a case-by-case basis will pre-
sumably be vested in the DOT, it is unclear how real the impact of this 
provision will be.105 Certainly, the provision is a far cry from the initial 
EU demands that engendered the DOT’s proposed rule on foreign 
management control.106 The question thus arises: why were EU nego-
tiators willing to accept such unbalanced terms on cabotage in ex-
change for what is arguably a negligible enhancement in foreign in-
vestment rights? 
 U.S. concessions undoubtedly played some role in bringing EU 
negotiators to the table.107 When the U.S. delegation flew to Brussels 
in January 2007 following withdrawal of the DOT proposal, it reiter-
ated a number of modest proposals, including one to open some 
forms of U.S. government-funded travel to EU carriers.108 The U.S. 
delegation also reiterated Washington’s support for granting antitrust 
immunity to U.S. and EU carriers entering into airline alliances, even 
though the persuasive impact of such assurances was no doubt negli-
gible because the United States already granted antitrust immunity to 
most of its bilateral Open Skies partners.109 The U.S. delegation seems 
to have gained real ground when it shifted the dialogue on foreign 
investment rights from a focus on “control” to a focus on “owner-
ship.”110 Even though the European Union had demanded broader 
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investment control from the start of negotiations, by January 2007 the 
U.S. delegation could point towards Congress’s intractability as a way 
of arguing credibly that if the European Union wanted any sort of 
Open Skies agreement, it would have to retreat from its initial posi-
tion.111 Ultimately, the proposal to grant EU nationals greater than 
fifty percent ownership of U.S. carriers on an ad hoc basis—albeit 
without traditional majority shareholder control rights—appears to 
have tilted the balance.112 
 Broader considerations played a crucial role in motivating the 
European Union to finalize an open skies agreement with the United 
States.113 For one thing, EU negotiators viewed any potential Open 
Skies agreement with the United States as simply the first in a series of 
commercial aviation agreements.114 The language of the Open Skies 
Agreement reflects this understanding.115 Article 21 of the agreement 
explicitly calls for “second stage negotiations” and stipulates that ne-
gotiations must begin “not later than 60 days after provisional applica-
tion” of the treaty.116 Among the “items of priority interest” identified 
for second stage negotiations are “further liberalisation of traffic 
rights” and “foreign investment opportunities.”117 Thus, in the second 
stage of negotiations following application of the Open Skies Agree-
ment, EU cabotage rights within the United States, along with 
broader foreign investment control rights, will presumably be issues 
for discussion.118 Whether this will do anything to alter the current 
U.S. position, however, is another matter.119 
 Perhaps the single greatest motivating factor for EU negotiators 
was the perceived economic value of a transatlantic Open Skies 
agreement.120 In March 2007, the EU Commission issued a press 
statement predicting that if approved, the Open Skies Agreement 
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would “provide for a thirty-four percent increase in trans-Atlantic air 
passenger traffic, [generating] up to $16 billion in economic benefits 
over five years and [creating] a total of 80,000 new jobs on the two 
sides of the Atlantic.”121 Another study prepared for the EU Commis-
sion by the consultancy Booz Allen Hamilton put the economic bene-
fits of a transatlantic Open Skies agreement between $9 billion and 
$17 billion over five years.122 Such perceptions seem to have been 
genuinely held by the European Union and the U.S. Department of 
State.123 Faced with such potentially immense benefits, EU negotiators 
were hardly in a position to walk away from negotiations in January 
2007, even after the U.S. Congress repudiated the compromise they 
had wrested from U.S. negotiators.124 
 Ironically, the 2002 ECJ rulings concerning bilateral Open Skies 
agreements with EU Member States may have also undermined the 
European Union’s bargaining position.125 In its 2002 rulings, the ECJ 
held that bilateral aviation agreements with individual EU Member 
States would no longer be permitted, yet the existing agreements were 
not immediately nullified.126 During negotiations leading up to com-
pletion of the Open Skies Agreement, the EU Commission “made 
clear that it would ask the [ECJ] to require EU members to terminate 
their bilateral agreements with the United States” in the event that no 
agreement was reached.127 Undoubtedly, the EU Commission took 
this tack in the hope of wresting further concessions from U.S. nego-
tiators.128 Nevertheless, the prospect of unraveling the entire transat-
lantic aviation regulatory order effectively acted as a double-edged 
sword, serving, if anything, to underscore the necessity of reaching an 
Open Skies agreement, whatever the cost.129 
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 Moving forward, the European Union will face real challenges as 
it attempts to address some of the second stage objectives enumerated 
in Article 21.130 It will not, however, be without negotiating power.131 
Congress invoked the talisman of aviation security to condemn the 
DOT’s proposed rule on foreign management rights.132 There is no 
reason to believe that it would not do so again if the White House en-
tertained the notion of granting broader management control rights 
to EU investors, let alone cabotage rights for foreign air travel within 
the United States.133 Labor groups, in particular, would be adamantly 
opposed.134 Nevertheless, EU negotiators have two powerful levers to 
pull as a way of drawing their U.S. counterparts to the table.135 First, 
the Open Skies Agreement contains an exit provision that permits EU 
Member States to suspend cabotage rights for U.S. carriers operating 
within Europe if there is no consensus on a second stage accord by 
2010.136 Second, the critical issue of airport slot allocations remains 
unsettled.137 Currently, slots are distributed to airlines on a legacy ba-
sis that favors carriers which have been flying the same routes for 
years.138 If the slot system were altered, however, to permit greater 
U.S. carrier access to Heathrow, for example, a powerful incentive 
could be created to wrest concessions from the United States.139 
Conclusion 
 The U.S.–EU Open Skies Agreement will undoubtedly benefit 
passengers on both sides of the Atlantic. New routes will link hitherto 
unconnected cities in the United States and Europe. Artificial restric-
tions on flight routing will be lifted, enabling carriers to chart their 
routes in greater accord with market forces. U.S. carriers will soon be 
permitted to compete within Europe, offering European travelers 
more options for air travel. Whether the economic benefits it yields 
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over the next five years are closer to $9 billion or $17 billion, the 
Open Skies Agreement will certainly usher in a more competitive 
transatlantic aviation order. Indeed, the only clear losers from the 
treaty are the carriers that benefited from the former protectionist 
regime, most notably British Airways and Virgin Atlantic. It is no co-
incidence that the greatest resistance to implementing the Open Skies 
Agreement came from Westminster.140 
 And yet, despite its promise, the Open Skies Agreement is hardly 
an optimal accord. There is little question that EU investors would 
have benefited from a more assertive EU negotiating stance, particu-
larly with regard to foreign management control rights. At the same 
time, the benefits to passengers—ironically, to U.S. passengers, in par-
ticular—would also have been considerable. With the notable excep-
tion of certain low-cost carriers, the troubled U.S. aviation industry 
has been cash-strapped for years and heavily reliant on government 
bailouts. Had EU negotiators enjoyed more success in securing tradi-
tional management control rights for EU investors, greater EU in-
vestment in U.S. carriers might have been encouraged, thereby foster-
ing a more financially solvent industry, with potential benefits to 
passengers, as well as to stockholders. Spurred by a desire to grow the 
market share of their carriers, foreign investors might well have used 
their control to offer passengers new routes, better service and more 
modern aircraft. 
 Regardless of how far the current Open Skies Agreement evolves, 
transatlantic travel is certain to change. At least in the near term, the 
domestic U.S. aviation market is unlikely to benefit from a dramatic 
infusion of foreign capital. The North Atlantic market, however, ap-
pears destined to grow and to become ever more competitive. Ryanair 
and its progeny will probably never fly between JFK and Heathrow, 
but over the next several years they could feasibly launch flights be-
tween Hartford, Connecticut, or Providence, Rhode Island and some 
of the satellite airports ringing London. Budget airlines flying out of 
mid-market airports would not draw many corporate travelers from 
the main urban hubs, but they might well carve out a niche for them-
selves amongst leisure travelers and small business owners. In the end, 
this could potentially drive down the price of economy-class tickets on 
more established carriers. It is ironic that the United States, a pioneer 
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in air travel liberalization, has taken such a resolutely protectionist 
position toward foreign ownership rights and domestic cabotage. At 
the same time, the United States may ultimately find the costs of in-
tractability untenable. 
